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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

EDITH CHLOE MATHIE,
Pla~ntiff

and Appellant,

-vs.-

. Case No. 9345

1VILLIAM TRUMAN MATHIE,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts summarizes the nature
of the controversy between the parties. It is incomplete
in many respects or it unduly emphasizes certain facts
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taken out of context or draws conclusions not justified
by the record. Therefore, defendant will outline the facts
as he sees them.
Plaintiff was awarded a decree of divorce from defendant. However, the acts of defendant were not aggravated and thereby lost no rights to a property distribution (R. 120).
The parties were married February 28, 1946. The
defendant is 53 years of age (R. 75), taught school for
two years (R. 75) but most of his adult life worked at
_. various occupations. At the time of the divorce, he was
a truck driver for a cleaning company, receiving a gross
salary of $60.00 per week (R. 76). The plaintiff is 52
years of age and the mother of grov~-rn daughters (R. 3738) from prior marriages. Both parties had been previously n1arried and divorced, the plaintiff hvice and the
defendant once. The plaintiff has a background of civil
service employment and, at the tin1e of the divorce, was
employed by the Utah Liquor Commission (R. 36) at a
gross salary of $260.00 per month (R. 51). Both parties suffer from heart conditions (Ex. 1 and 2), the defendant having suffered a heart attack prior to plaintiff
filing the action and had not fully recovered to resume
employnwnt -when the action \Yas filed.
The only property involved is a unit located on
Seventh East Street in Salt Lake City. Utah, consisting
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of two buildings, one which is a house and one which has
four apartment units, but each building is separated from
the other, althoug~ the same heating plant is piped into
both buildings. The house was rented for $85.00 per
month (R. 63) and the parties resided in one of the apartments in the other building and rented the three remaining apartlnents for $45.00 per month each (R. 62). Defendant had found the property for sale which "\Yas purehased for $13,500.00 and the plaintiff advanced the initial do·wn pay1nent of $4,000.00 (R. 61). Defendant 1nade
improveinents on the property costing approximately
$2300.00, ·which helped to enhance the market value of
the property to $25,000.00 (R. 91). The improvements
were paid from defendant's own income (R .68-69), but
the taxes, utilities, repairs, monthly payments, and other
expenses were paid from the rents. Plaintiff always collected the rents and made the disbursements. Defendant
did chores such as mowing the lawn, fixing gaskets, furnace and other odds and ends necessary. The rental
units were unfurnished.
Plaintjff's complaint was filed on October 13, 1959
(R. 2) and on the same date, October 13, 1959, the plaintiff deeded the property to her daughter. Although the
deed recites October 13, 1949 (R. 19), unquestionably the
1949 was typographical error. Plaintiff was employed

and all the units were rented and there was no necessity
for the allleged sale (R. 30).
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Plaintiff had obtained record title to the property
as result of a divorce action filed in August of 1953 (R.
53), which was terminated in December of the same
year by the defendant conveying to the plaintiff the fee
to the property as result of an agreement partly oral
(R. 73) and partly written (Ex. 2) whereby the plaintiff
recited she had executed a will (Ex. 1) leaving the defendant a life estate in the property. Defendant had been
assured, prior to the execution of the will, by the plaintiff and her counsel, that plaintiff would be protected
in the property for life (R. 73).
The decree of the Court awarded possession of the
house to plaintiff (R. 147) and of the apartments to the
defendant (R. 147). Both parties were awarded a life
estate in the property and the plaintiff and her heirs
were awarded the remainder (R. 148). The decree further provided, in the event the parties Inutually agreed

to sell the property, the net sales price would be distributed as follow·s: One-half of the net sales price plus
$2,500.00 to plaintiff and one-half of the net sales price
less $2,500.00 to defendant (R. 147-148), thereby giving
plaintiff $5,000.00 1nore than defendant and not $2,500.00
rnore as stated in Page 3 of plaintiff's brief. Before sale,
the rents and expenses were to be enjoyed and borne by
each part)r E'qnally (R. 147). The details of the decree

in diRpute will be discussed hereafter in defendant's
argun1ent of points.
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STATE1IENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE

FINDINGS

AND

DECREE

OF

THE

COURT

AWARDED ·TO DEFENDANT THE INTEREST IN THE
APARTMENT AND HOME AS PROVIDED IN THE ORAL
AND WRITTEN RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT AND ARE
ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.
POINT II.
'THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY IS EQUITABLE AND JUST.
POINT III.
THE COURT'S DECREE IS NOT UNCERTAIN, NOR
AMBIGUOUS, NOR INEQUITABLE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE

FINDINGS

AND

DECREE

OF

THE

COURT

AWARDED ·TO DEFENDANT THE INTEREST IN THE
APARTMENT AND HOME AS PROVIDED IN THE ORAL
AND \VRITTEN RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT AND ARE
ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.
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Plaintiff cites authorities to support her argument.
None of the cases have a fact situation similar to the one
at bar. The cases discuss the general law as applied in
the particular jurisdiction to reconciliation agreements
and the respective courts hold such agreements valid or
invalid depending on the facts as developed in each case.
Defendant agrees many jurisdictions uphold reconciliation agreements when not tainted in smne way. Other
jurisdictions look upon such agreements ''lith disfavor.
\Ve need not concern ourselves with the latter cases for
the decree of the trial court fully confonns to the law
as discussed in the cases cited hy plaintiff and to the
l::nv interpreting contracts.
Defendant did not intend to give plaintiff an unenculnbered fee of the property when he signed the agreeInent (Ex. 2).
Prior to the execution of the agreement, the plaintiff
and defendant discussed the matter of an agreement (R.
73). The defendant was asked as follows:
Q.

\Vhen was there a eonversation about the
agreementf

A.

\Vell, it wasn't too long after that until my
wife said we could make it, she would be willing to emne back and live with me if I would
sign the deed over to her, that she· would make
an agreement wherein I would be protected.
That's exactly the words she told me. I said
wrhnt is all right. it js okeh with me."
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The agreement (Ex. 2) was prepared by plaintiff's
attorney (R. 73). This is what took place in his office:
A.

. .. We went down to her attorney and made
out the agreement first and I asked just exactly what it meant. He told me in these exact
words, "The deed is in your wife's name."
She was the owner of the property but that
"You would have a place to stay as long as
you live," and I signed the agreement and
then the deed was put over into my wife's
name.

The plaintiff vvanted the property in her own nmne.
'rhere can he no dispute about this. She told hin1 he
would be ''protected." Her lawyer drew the agree1nent;
the defendant wanted to know what it meant. The lawyer
gave assurance it meant defendant would have a place
to stay for life.
Paragraph 2 of the agreen1ent (Ex. 2) supports defendant. It reads as follov,'s:
"That Edith Chloe Mathie has this day executed her last will and testament leaving said
property to her two daughters, subject to a life
estate granted to her husband, William Truman
:Jr athie.''
This clause is only an assertion of what plaintiff did as a
fact. The agremnent is silent as to why she executed it.
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Only one conclusion can be drawn from her act- that the
will was a part of the protection for life the defendant
retained in the property.
The trial court did not make a new contract for the
parties. It is permissable to supply the things which were
omitted in the agreement if the part omitted is not inconsistent with the writing but independent of and in addition to it. (12 Am. Juris. 78, Par. 235, 92 A.L.R. 240.
Harvey v. Richmond, F. & P.R. Com.162 Va. 49,173 SE
351, 92 A.L.R. 240.)
The finding of the trial court is not inconsistent but
simply supplied a very material omission from the written_ agreement which the parties had intended and discussed orally (R. 73).
Defendant wanted protection during all of his life,
not simply in the contingency of surviving plaintiff.
Ownership of the fee is what the plaintiff desired and got,
but neither party intended to preclude the defendant
from enjoying a beneficial interest in the property while
alive. Plaintiff recognized defendant's beneficial interest
for life since the Virill (Ex. 1) granting him a life interest
is not limited to the contingency the parties were still
n1arried at the time of plaintiff's demise.
After the reconciliation, the conduct of the parties
towards the property was the same as before the recon-
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ciliation. Plaintiff continued to collect the rents, make
pay1nents on the purchase price and other expenses from
the rents received. Defendant mowed the lawn, fixed gaskets, worked on the furnace and did the odds and ends
in and about the property (R. 66, 67).
The other provisions in the decree pertaining to the
property give effect to the decree. Defendant's life estate
entitles hin1 to a portion of the net rents, but should the
parties Inutually agree to sell the property, his life estatn
would tenninate, so he would be entitled to be emnpen~atPd for hi~ intPrcst.
Defendant did not breach the agreement. Ho-..\ ever,
there was a breach of the agreen1ent in the case at bar
hy plaintiff. Plaintiff deliberately conveyed the property
to her daughters with the intent to defeat defendant's interest in the property. Plaintiff, by the conveyance,
would hav\' been unable to perform one of the provisions
()f thr agreement leaving defendant a life estate in the
1n·operty hy will.
7

Defendant found no case similar to that at bar, nor
one where the plaintiff ·who benefited by the reconciliation agreen1ent later breached a provision thereof. The
<>ourt, however, having equity po\vers in this type of action, C'an req:1ire the breach to he repaired, if at all possible. Plaintiff now has the property in her name again
;:nd has repaired the breach so that the decree of the
<>ourt di8tributing the property can be enforced.
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POINT II.
'THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY IS EQUITABLE AND JUST.

Plaintiff contends the Findings of Fact and Decree
relating to the home and apartment house, together with
the court's comments, evidence considerable vindictiveness.
Counsel for plaintiff admits the conveyance by plaintiff to her daughter for a consideration of $700.00 could
not be condoned and was ill advised. He states the matter
has been corrected. We presume he means plaintiff now
has the property back in her name. Then he contends
that, as a result of the uncondoned and ill-advised conveyance, the trial judge became vindictive and distributed
the property inequitably and unjustly. The comments of
the trial judge were pertinent and to the point but we
need not concern ourselves with the1n for the distribution itself is the best evidence of his fairness.
The real con1plaint of the plaintiff is not the vindictiveness of the trial judge but that she did not receive all
of the property. The defendant found the property and
it was purchased for $13,500.00. True, the plaintiff made
the down payment of $4,000.00, but the defendant, with
his own funds totaling $2300.00, exclusive of his own
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labor, 1nade i1nprovements which helped to enhance its
value. The Inarket value of the property is now $25,000.00. The payments on the purchase, after the initial
down payment and other expenses, were paid from rents.
The defendant did the odd jobs around the property
while, except for the initial payment, plaintiff's contribution to help enhance the value of the property consisted
in Rpending smne of the m.oney received from rents. The
court recognized the direct payment of the plaintiff and
the i1nprove1nents made by the defendant by giving the
plaintiff $5,000.00 rnore jn the event the property is sold.
Both parties benefited by living on the premises. Taking
into ('Onsi.deration that the defendant had been joint
owner with the plaintiff frmn the time of purchase to

1953, to say such distribution is inequitable and vindicatve is a shocking and unconscienab1e statement.
POINT III.
THE COURT'S DECREE IS NOT UNCERTAIN, NOR
AMBIGUOUS, NOR INEQUITABLE.

vV e cannot follow plantiff's argument on Pages 10,
11 and 12 of her brief. The Decree unequivocably gave
the defendant possession of the apartment and to the
plaintiff the house (R. 147) but, in the event the property
was not sold ·while defendant was alive, having used the
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premises for living and their normal pursuits of life,
the fee was to he distributed to plaintiff, her heirs, devisees and legatees (R. 148).
The plaintiff could live in the house (R. 147). Nothing was said about defendant living in the apartment
house, but, since he was given possession thereof, (R.
147), there is no reason why he could not do so. There
is no dispute that each party was given possession of
their respective units. The only question is how the
rents and expenses were to be deter1nined. Plaintiff
claims certain ambiguities on this point. These alleged
a1nbiguities the trial judge found were not grounds for
a new trial but he was ·willing to clarify whatever was
shown to be necessary (R. 136). He invited respective
counsel to get together and stipulate to any points needing clarification and recmnmend how best to accomplish
the same within the intention of 'the Court (R. 136). The
. court was not delegating the task to the attorneys. He
just wanted the attorneys to agree on the points upon
which his action, if any, was desired, and suggest the
necessary language which, if within the intention of the
court, he· could incorporate in the Decree or not as he saw
. fit. Such procedure is not unusual but desirable. It not
only saves time but the points in question would be delineated for orderly argu1nent.
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Counsel for defendant does not believe the Decree is
ambiguous, although several details need clarification
and the ·trial judge was willing to clarify them. Plaintiff's counsel refused to give the trial judge the courtesy
of doing so and now complains of ambiguity.
Defendant realizes the Decree raises certain administrative problems which can be simplified. Certain suggestions were made to plaintiff's counsel prior to argument on the motion for new trial and the same would
have been suggested to the trial judge, had the opportunity arisen. Defendant's counsel received the impression during the argument on the motion for a new trial
that counsel were to discuss various matters and return
to the court, at which time the suggestions would have
been presented, but, since counsel for plaintiff refused
to discuss the matter further with the trial judge, the
suggestions were not presented. We believe the following
suggestions are within the intention of the Decree and
would clarify all alleged ambiguities. We submit them
for your consideration. That each of the parties have
sole possession of their respective units as set forth in
the Decree ; that plaintiff reside in the house which has
a rental value of $85.00, if she desires, or rent 1he same,
keep the rents and pay the expenses thereon whether she
lives therein or not; that defendant may occupy one of
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the apartment units, which has a rental value of $45.00,
chosen by him in the apartments rent free; that he collect the rents at the apartment house, pay the expenses
of maintaining the apartments, and the net rents from
the apartments be divided between the plaintiff and defendant.

CONCLUSION
Th~

property rights of the parties are vital to each
of them. The record in every way justifies the award
made to the defendant and the Decree is just and equitable.
Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH C. FRATTO,
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
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